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Abstract
In recent years, image manipulation is becoming in-
creasingly more accessible, yielding more natural-looking
images, owing to the modern tools in image processing and
computer vision techniques. The task of the identification
of forged images has become very challenging. Amongst
different types of forgeries, the cases of Copy-Move forgery
are increasing manifold, due to the difficulties involved to
detect this tampering. To tackle such problems, publicly
available datasets are insufficient. In this paper, we propose
to create a synthetic forged dataset using deep semantic im-
age inpainting and copy-move forgery algorithm. However,
models trained on these datasets have a significant drop in
performance when tested on more realistic data. To allevi-
ate this problem, we use unsupervised domain adaptation
networks to detect copy-move forgery in new domains by
mapping the feature space from our synthetically generated
dataset. Furthermore, we improvised the F1 score on CA-
SIA and CoMoFoD dataset to 80.3% and 78.8%, respec-
tively. Our approach can be helpful in those cases where
the classification of data is unavailable.
1. Introduction
With the advancement of new image editing technolo-
gies, there is a sharp increase in the number of forgery
cases. While sophisticated image editing tools are meant
to enhance the quality of images, they are misused to create
forged images for nefarious purposes. These images look
so natural that it is difficult to tell with naked eyes whether
they have been tampered or are they authentic. It has led to
a rise in the cases of image forgery in several fields - med-
ical imaging, industrial photography, surveillance system,
criminal, and forensic investigation. [10]
There are diverse ways of forging images, of which
Copy-Move, Splicing, Retouching, and Resampling forg-
eries are the most common ones. Copy-Move Forgery
(CMF) is a type of passive image forgery technique in
which a section of an image is copied and pasted within the
same image. Many post-image processing operations such
as rescaling, affine transformations, resizing, and blurring
are applied to the copied region. As the source and target
image remains the same, the photometric characteristics of
the image remain mostly invariable. Thus, the detection be-
comes even more difficult. For instance, in contrast to CMF,
splicing forgery is a composition of two images. A section
is cut from an image and pasted on another image. As a
result, there is an edge discrepancy that makes the detection
of splicing forgery relatively easier.
Image tampering can have significant effects in various
domains. For instance, in medical imaging, the images are
procured with the utmost sensitivity and is a tiresome pro-
cess. There can be ulterior economical motives for tam-
pering these confidential and sophisticated images. Conse-
quently, it could misguide the patients about their illnesses
and injuries. In the field of education, students can tamper
their documents with online available software tools. The
significant impact of image tampering can happen in the
socio-political area, as manipulated images can affect the
perception of a large group of people. Many magazines and
newspaper editors tamper the images in such a way that they
can change the semantic meaning of the image.
There have been several traditional approaches for
forgery detection that include mostly block-based and key-
point feature extraction [7, 16, 21] and matching proce-
dures. Nowadays, deep learning approaches [20, 1, 17]
have been proposed to counterattack the problem of image
forgery. However, most of the approaches are based on su-
pervised learning. When there are a lot of labeled examples,
then it is easy to train the model via supervised learning. To
counter the problems of training data, we generally surro-
gate the training data by including the dataset from adjacent
modality or use synthetic imagery. When the same model
is evaluated on these datasets, it results in a significant drop
in the performance. It happens due to the shift in style, con-
tent, or appearance distribution between various datasets. In
these cases, domain adaptation is needed to learn the distri-
bution shift.
In this work, we show that manipulations in images
across different domains can be detected via domain adap-
tation. We leverage the power of Convolutional Neural
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Figure 1. The first and second column shows the example of target domain dataset (CASIA and CoMoFoD respectively). Subsequent
column shows the generated synthetic data from COCO dataset using semantic inpainting and copy-move forgery algorithm. First row is
authentic image of each category and second row is forged image.
networks (CNNs) to perceive the distinguishable features
of authentic and tampered images. We tackle the prob-
lem of performance drop by incorporating the feature space
alignment between our synthetic generated datasets and
datasets that are publicly available. We generate the syn-
thetic dataset using Edge-connect semantic inpainting and
CMF algorithm.
Contributions Our main contributions in the paper are
summarized as follows: 1) The primary task is to classify
images as forged or authentic, for which we employ Un-
supervised Domain Adaptation (DA), due to the difference
in content and style between our source and target dataset,
2) As the publicly available datasets are small, we gener-
ate a new dataset comprising of 80,000 images using deep
semantic inpainting and copy-move forgery algorithms on
COCO [6] dataset, and 3) We explore two Unsupervised
DA methods to adapt the features from source dataset to
target dataset, such that the variation between the domains
is minimized.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II describes
the traditional and deep learning solutions that evolved over
the years for forgery classification and a review of domain
adaptation methods. Section III describes our methodology
in detail that involves dataset generation, Unsupervised DA,
and final architectures used for training. After that, in Sec-
tion IV, we evaluate the performance of our architecture on
CASIA[2] and CoMoFoD[13] dataset. Section V discusses
the conclusion and future directions of our work.
2. Related Work
Early works on forgery detection involved traditional ap-
proaches such as Block-based and Keypoint-based. In re-
cent years, with the emerging applications of neural nets,
more work is motivated using CNNs. Considering issues in
the forgery detection areas, like small datasets or unavail-
ability of labels, now there is work that has started focusing
on unsupervised learning. Below, we briefly describe some
earlier and contemporary work.
Block-based approaches divide the image into chunks
of the block that may overlap each other. Then, features
are extracted from these blocks and matched against each
other to compare the similarity between blocks. For fea-
ture extraction, the primary methods used are Frequency
transform, Texture and intensity-based features, moments,
invariant features, and dimensional reduction techniques.
Frequency transform methods [16] are robust to JPEG com-
pression and helps reduce computational complexity, albeit,
the main disadvantage was that they were only restricted
to JPEG compressed images. Their performance was not
checked on TIFF image formats. Texture and Identity-based
features were incapable to deal with variable angle rotation
in images. Moment invariant methods such as Central and
Zernike are robust to translation, scaling, rotation, and con-
trast changes with improvement in time. In dimensional re-
duction techniques, there is a loss in image details and, thus,
low performance in JPEG compressed images. Coming
to the block-based matching, Lexicographical Matching,
Hashing, Euclidean Distance are some of the approaches
used to match the blocks based on defined thresholds. How-
ever, much unwanted time is wasted in comparing the simi-
larity between these blocks.
In Key-point methods, SIFT and SURF are primarily
used to extract features from images. The main shortcom-
ings are the failure to recognize feature points in flat areas
and detect forged regions if the copy and pasted area looks
naturally similar. For example, an area of grass is cropped
and pasted over the same region where the grass is present.
Then, no helpful features can be extracted for matching pur-
poses. In the keypoint feature matching process, we need to
keep a check on several hyperparameters involving similar-
ity matching threshold and window size for comparison of
patches. They also encounter high time complexity as they
have to match so many number of feature points.
More recently, CNNs based approaches have started
evolving with the ability of neural networks to memorize
complex visual features. This can be contemplated by the
admirable performance of CNNs in various domains. Zhang
et al. [20] divides images into 32x32 patches and matches
them using nearest neighbourhood algorithm. In [9], forg-
eries are detected using hand-crafted filters and features.
This steganalysis approach helps to identify diverse types
of forgeries, but, there are hundreds of parameters that need
to be tuned manually. [18] applies self-correlation between
different blocks extracted from an image. Then, they em-
ploy a pointwise feature extractor to match similar points
and generates a mask over a forged region. Busternet,[17]
the further work of this paper, uses a two branch architec-
ture, to localize the manipulated regions. They created a
dataset of one lakh images and then applied a supervised
pixel label classification to learn forged features.
In DA, initially, statistical-based approaches were used
to minimise the distribution shift such as Correlation Align-
ment, Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) and Kullback-
Leibler divergence. [15] They calculate the distance and
apply linear transformation to align the features of source
domain to target domain before sending them for classi-
fication. The latest advances using CNNs helps to learn
more transferable features. Domain Adverarial Neural Net-
work (DANN), Deep Domain Confusion (DDC), Adversar-
ial Discriminative Domain Adaptation and Joint Adaptation
Network [15] are few of the methods that have illustrated a
significant improve in unsupervised DA. DANN and DDC
use a shared feature extraction layer and then apply mini-
max and domain confusion loss to adapt the feature space.
Annadani’s et al. work is the first use case of domain adap-
tation in the field of image forgery. They used supervised
domain adaptation using the Maximum Mean Discrepancy
(MMD) loss criterion to decrease the domain discrepancy.
Our work is built upon the one reported in [1] and [3]. The
synthetic dataset created by them only included a feather-
ing approach to create an image, which is more suitable for
spliced forgery cases. It does not adapt very well if the im-
age is cut-pasted on the same image, as the characteristics
as a whole remain consistent.
3. Methodology
3.1. Dataset Generation
We applied two methods to generate the dataset. The
inclusion of any one of them shows an increase in perfor-
mance. Semantic Inpainting helps the model to learn edge
discrepancies when the objects are removed. Copy-Move
tampered images improve the focus of the network to rec-
ognize similar patches.
3.1.1 Semantic Inpainting
We synthesized a dataset of inpainted images using all
the sub-categories of the COCO dataset [6] equally. The
mask of particular sub-categories was cropped out. After
that, Edge-connect [8] inpainting is used. It is a type of
Deep Semantic inpainting that uses a two-stage approach
to complete an image. Firstly, the edge generator fills out
the missing edges, and then the image completion network
completes the image based on the edges deduced. Using
the above approach, we created approximately 20,000 in-
painted images.
3.1.2 Copy-Move Forgery: Using Object ROI
To generate copy-paste forged images, we selected a spe-
cific category of the COCO dataset. Then, we took into
consideration of each mask’s area belonging to that cate-
gory. Comparing all the mask areas, we select the mask
with the largest area. Now, this copied area is pasted over
the image after affine transformations and image blending
operations. Blending helps the image to fuse in another im-
age smoothly. If an object is just copy-paste, then there is
a distinctive boundary that can easily be detected by the al-
gorithm. It’s not helpful at the test time, as, in both CASIA
and CoMoFoD dataset, the copied areas are post-processed
and then pasted. Henceforth, we applied a combination of
alpha blending (using eqn (1)) and Deep Image Matting[19]
operations so that the pasted regions could easily fit on the
second image. With this approach, we created a dataset
of approximately 60,000 images. Figure 2 illustrates the
method of dataset generation.
I f = αF + (1− α)B (1)
where If is final image, F is foreground object, B is back-
ground image and α is the blending factor.
3.2. Unsupervised Domain Adaptation
Domain Adaptation (DA) is useful in the areas where
the dataset with labels are present in a small amount. Usu-
Figure 2. Dataset Generation method: In first approach, Edge semantic inpaint fills the region where object is removed. In CMF, a specific
category is picked and copy-pasted on the same image. We generated a dataset of 80,000 images.
ally, most of the domain adaptation task focuses on an unsu-
pervised approach as the number of target labels present is
very small in real-world and labels are mostly absent. Un-
supervised DA has a generalized architecture that depends
on three parameters. Firstly, it depends on the base model,
whether it is generative or discriminative, next, based on
weight sharing between source and target domain, and,
lastly what type of adversarial loss is used (see Fig. 3). In
our paper, we explored two unsupervised DA methods, that
are DANN[3] and DDC[14]. Both of them have a discrim-
inative base model, and the weights between the layers are
shared. The adversarial loss in the case of DANN is min-
imax, whereas, in DDC, it’s confusion loss. The detailed
architectures are discussed in the subsequent subsections.
Figure 3. Generalized architecture of Unsupervised Domain Adap-
tation algorithms
3.2.1 DANN
This approach involves the creation of a feature space of
images present in the source and target domain. We aim
to create a distribution of feature representations such that
it is discriminatory among classes and invariant across do-
mains. At the training time, images of both the domains are
present, but we have access to class labels of only the source
domain. DANN has two separate heads, Source Classifi-
cation (SC) head, and Domain Classification (DC) head.
In SC, feature mapping parameters(θf ) and label classifier
parameters(θs) are optimized as such to reduce the classifi-
cation loss(Ls) in case of the source domain (2). While in
DC, feature mapping parameters(θf ) maximizes the domain
loss(Ld) so that the distribution of both domains becomes
similar (3). It simultaneously minimizes the classification
loss for the image, whether it comes from a source or target
distribution. Let source ,feature and target distributions be
denoted as Ds(x,y), Df(x,y) and Dt(x,y), respectively, where
x is input image feature space and y is the label annotated
to that image.
(θˆf , θˆs) = argminL(θf , θs, θd) (2)
θˆd = argmaxL(θf , θs, θd) (3)
In this way, the network increases the confusion between
source and target domain, so that the model focuses more
on the features that help to distinguish images amongst dif-
ferent classes. As mentioned above, DANN optimizes two
Figure 4. DANN model is divided into three components: i) fea-
ture extractor, ii) source classifier, and iii) domain classifier. Joint
loss is used to improve the network’s ability to assign category and
domain labels to images.
loss functions concurrently during backpropagation. To im-
plement the losses, Stochastic gradient descent can’t be di-
rectly applied. So, the authors introduced a particular layer
called Gradient Reversal Layer (GRL), which is present in
the DC network. During forward pass, it acts as an iden-
tity transform. At the time of backpropagation, it multiplies
the gradient by a negative constant (-∆) and passes it to the
previous layers. The overall loss function is defined in the
(4).
L(θf , θs, θd) =
∑
x=1...N
Ls(Ds(Df), yi)
+(∆)
∑
x=1...N
Ld(Dt(Df), yi) (4)
3.2.2 DDC
Using domain confusion loss, DDC learns the mapping of
the source domain. It minimizes the distance between the
source and target distributions via Maximum Mean Dis-
crepancy (MMD) loss. The architecture separately learns
the discriminative features needed to classify via supervised
learning using source images and labels and features re-
quired to classify the domain of the image. Let the map-
ping of source domain be Ds and mapping of target do-
main be Dt, then the network aims to learn a representation
that could easily be transferable across various domains.
The joint loss function used to train this architecture com-
prises of categorical cross entropy loss (Lclassify) and penalty
parameter(α) multiplied by MMD loss.
Ltotal = Lclassify(x, y) + αMMD
2(Ds, Dt) (5)
where MMD (Ds, Dt) is the distance between the domains
calculated using eqn.(6), and, ds and dt are data points from
source and target domains respectively.
MMD(Ds, Dt) =
∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1|Ds|
∑
dsDs
φ (ds)− 1|Dt|
∑
dtDt
φ (dt)
∥∥∥∥∥∥ (6)
The main difference compared to DANN is the use of
confusion loss. In DDC, domain confusion and domain
classifier loss are separate. Domain confusion maximizes
the loss across domains, whereas, in DANN, minimax loss,
simultaneously converges two loss functions. In DANN and
DDC, the weights are tied, making it symmetric mapping
between the domains. It enforces both the domains to have
the same representations in feature space.
Figure 5. The DDC network use a shared feature extraction layer
to adapt the features of target domain. Meanwhile, transfer adap-
tation loss minimizes the distribution shift between the fc layers.
3.3. Architecture
The base model of our architecture extracts features from
images. In DANN, after feature extraction, the DC network
predicts the domain of the input image, and the SC network
predicts the label for source samples. Figure 4 depicts the
architecture of our proposed approach. At the time of train-
ing, we know whether the source domain image is authentic
or forged, while we did not use labels of the target domain.
We used binary labels to indicate whether the input image
comes from the source or target distribution. In the case of
DDC, the last fc layer features compute the MMD distance
between the domains. This distance is then backpropagated
to minimize the classification loss and maximize the domain
confusion loss.
4. Experiments Analysis
4.1. Dataset Tested
We evaluated our architecture on CASIA V2 and CoMo-
FoD datasets. In our case, the source domain constitutes
of COCO CMF and semantic inpainted images, and, tar-
get domain comprises CASIA V2 and CoMoFoD datasets.
Exhaustive experiments were done using AlexNet [5] and
VGG-7 [11] for feature extraction. These datasets are ex-
plained briefly in the following sections:
4.1.1 CASIA V2.0
It contains 12,614 images in total, of which 7,497 are au-
thentic, and 5,123 are forged images. The resolution of im-
ages ranges from 240 x 160 to 900 x 600. The tampered
images have been applied to post-processing operations and
saved in JPEG and TIFF formats. Out of these 5,123 tam-
pered images, 3,274 images are copy-move, and 1,788 are
splicing. The number of authentic images presents, respec-
tively, for forged images, are 1,701. Henceforth, our total
dataset size comes out to be of 4,975 images.
4.1.2 CoMoFoD
This dataset contains 400 images, 200 authentic, and 200
forged. It contains only copy-move forgery cases in PNG
format. The dimension of images in this dataset is 512 x
512. Various distortions such as translation, rotation, and
scaling are applied to tampered images.
4.2. Implementation Details
We explored diverse color spaces to get a sense of the
behavior of CMF images in different color spaces. Using
Alexnet for feature extraction and DANN for domain adap-
tation, we varied the number of CMF images across RGB
and YCrCb color space for the CASIA dataset. Chromi-
nance component of YCrCb illuminates the identical re-
gions in images with the same luminosity. It helps the deep
networks to visualize copy-pasted regions in images.
In DANN, we used categorical cross-entropy as loss
function and Adam optimizer with learning rate 0.001. The
DDC network is trained using Stochastic Gradient Descent
optimizer, with a momentum value of 0.9, and learning
rate value of 0.0001. At the time of training, we initially
used only CMF images for unsupervised domain adapta-
tion. Then, we included semantic inpainted images to study
the effects of edge discrepancy in recognizing forged im-
ages. There are no labels used at the time of training. For
the target domain, images are passed with a domain label
attached to it, and the source domain has a class label also
assigned to it. The source model adapts the weights to clas-
sify target images with the same features into a particular
category.
During testing, the target images are passed through the
source classifier model, whose weights are now adapted
to features specific to target data. We divided the CASIA
dataset into an 80:20 ratio. 80% of the data used for train-
ing, and then, 20% used for testing. As CoMoFoD con-
tains only 200 images, all the images were used to learn
the discriminative features, as well as for evaluation. We
used classification accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score
as performance metrics to evaluate our architectures. Preci-
sion is expressed as the number of true positives divided by
the sum of true and false positives. The recall is defined as
the ratio of true positives by true positives and false nega-
tives. F1- score is the harmonic mean of recall and precision
score.
4.3. Performance Analysis
We will now discuss the results summarized in Table 1,
2 and 3. We trained our architecture on source dataset and
evaluated it on target dataset. From Table 1, we can visu-
alize the performance of architecture in RGB and YCrCb
space.
Number of Accuracy Score F1- Score
images used RGB YCrCb RGB YCrCb
20,000 59.76 57.62 72.12 70.47
30,000 61.84 58.27 72.73 71.59
40,000 63.52 59.7 73.15 72.86
50,000 63.91 62.78 76.51 73.02
60,000 65.39 64.29 78.83 77.97
Table 1. Color space accuracy comparison with Copy-Move forged
images only in RGB and YCrCb space
As the number of images increased, the results improved
for domain adaptation. Due to complex post-processing op-
erations, YCrCb space was unable to localize same tam-
pered regions. As RGB color space performed better, there-
fore, for our future training of domain adaptation algo-
rithms, we chose RGB images for source and target do-
mains.
In starting, we only used CMF images for unsupervised
DA. DANN and DDC were able to minimize the distance
between the two datasets distributions, but using only CMF
images makes the network biased towards objects resem-
bling the same feature characteristics. To analyze the contri-
bution of the amount of CMF images for domain adaptation,
we examined each time with an increment of 10,000 im-
ages. We saw that just by increasing CMF images, there are
no noteworthy changes in the accuracy and F1-score on the
target domain. In cases where the copied and background
region are the same, e.g., grass, then the model is unable
to distinguish the image as authentic or tampered. To alle-
viate this problem, we incorporated semantic inpainted im-
ages to learn the edge discriminative features. It helped the
Source Images COCO→ CASIA COCO→ CoMoFoD
CMF Inpaint DDC DANN DDC DANN
Authentic Forged Authentic Forged Acc. F1 Acc. F1 Acc. F1 Acc. F1
10,000 10,000 - - 60.63 71.92 59.76 71.47 60.25 61.52 51 63.7
10,000 10,000 5,000 5,000 66.56 80.18 64.78 78.52 66.25 78.99 51.29 65.48
10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 64.26 77.74 64.85 76.54 63.25 76.12 51.71 63.38
15,000 15,000 5,000 5,000 67.97 76.62 65.91 79.16 57 76.05 51.75 67.12
Table 2. Evaluation of DANN and DDC trained with base feature extraction model as Alexnet varying the amount and type of source
domain images.
Architecture CASIA CoMoFoD
Precision Recall F-1 Precision Recall F-1
BusterNet [17] 78.22 73.89 75.98 57.34 49.39 49.26
DDC MMD AlexNet 68.02 97.73 80.18 65.62 97.86 78.99
DDC MMD VGG 57.27 95.02 70.13 65.39 91.24 76.18
DANN AlexNet 66.19 98.47 79.16 51.05 83.5 63.34
DANN VGG 68.26 99.84 80.34 49.65 72.04 58.75
Table 3. Comparison from previous architecture BusterNet[17]. Our model DANN with VGG feature extraction and DDC with AlexNet
performs the best on CASIA and CoMoFoD dataset respectively.
Figure 6. Accuracy/F1-score v/s Number of source images used.
This plot shows the COCO→ CASIA case.
model to learn the dissimilarities near the edges of the im-
ages are copy-pasted. As the target domain contains CMF
images, increasing the distribution of semantic images be-
yond 10,000 images leads to drop in performance. Table
2 shows the effect of utilizing both semantic inpainted and
copy-move tampered images. In contrast to contemporary
networks such as Inception[12] and ResNet[4], we used
AlexNet and VGG-7 as our base models, because, these net-
works have a huge number of parameters and due to limited
amount of target domain images, the model doesn’t gener-
alize well.
COCO→ CASIA: In CASIA, there are 3979 images used
for training purposes and 996 images for evaluation. With
DDC, we saw a sudden jump by including semantic in-
painted images. Using DANN, we achieved the best score,
when the highest number of images were used. As there is
a large number of images available at the time of training,
we can see from Table 3 that DANN+VGG-7 achieves the
highest recall and F1-score.
COCO → CoMoFoD: CoMoFoD dataset is very small.
Due to the presence of 200 images only, we trained and
evaluated on the whole dataset. With the increase in the
number of images in the source domain, accuracy and F1
score decreased in DDC, and, insignificant increase using
DANN. As the dataset was small, we can see from Table 3
that DDC+ MMD with Alexnet as base model performed
better compared to VGG-7. VGG-7 has a huge number of
parameters that can’t be optimized; hence, they performed
poorly at the test time.
To compare with previous work, we analyzed our re-
sults with BusterNet architecture. They mainly took into ac-
count of CASIA CMF and CoMoFoD dataset. Other works,
mainly used all images of CASIA dataset, not explicitly for
CMF images. In BusterNet, they created and trained on 1
lakh images for supervised training, and then evaluated on
these datasets. In CoMoFoD, they used 200 images as ours,
but, in CASIA, they took only 1356 CMFD images into ac-
count compared to 4975 of ours. Our approach improves
the accuracy by 5-6% in the case of CASIA and 27-28%
in the case of CoMoFoD. Table 3 shows the performance
comparison between ours and BusterNet. Whereas Buster-
Net has used pixel-wise annotations to learn the class of
images, we have not used any label at the time of training.
In our case, as the data distribution is too much imbalanced,
precision and recall score plays a significant role. We can
see that our precision score is not in the comparable range
of recall scores. It is due to the reason, as we have less num-
ber of positive class images in contrast to the negative class.
As we look into the denominator of precision and recall, in
the first case, the denominator is the sum of true plus false
positives. Now, we have too many images in a false class.
It attributes to a large number of false positives. Whereas
in the recall, the denominator is the sum of true positives
plus false negatives. The false-negative number is less as
the number of images in the correct class is fewer.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we suggested a new approach for data gen-
eration to counter the problem of small, publicly available
datasets for image forgery. We outlined novel unsupervised
learning approaches to detect CMF in images. We presented
evaluation over different feature extraction models. Our ap-
proach outperforms the accuracy of the previous method,
which incorporates supervised deep learning. In the future,
we aim to explore GANs for the generation of realistic tam-
pered images and the inclusion of splicing forgery to make
our model more robust.
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